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Abstract 
 
The notion of transparency is widely used as an analytical tool and as a guideline to propose 
and enforce new configurations of economic life. Focusing on several transparency-making 
devices, this paper tries to explore both the pervasiveness of this notion and its ambivalence in 
a number of relevant sites. We begin by exploring the deployment of transparency in the 
economic literature at large. We identify three thematic areas, namely, markets and price 
discovery, corporate management and institutional investors, and state regulations and 
economic policy. We then tackle these three areas of meaning through three brief case 
studies: (1) transparency and anonymity in the context of exchange automation, (2) ballot 
statement controversies in the light of corporate governance principles and (3) the use of 
transparency at state level in the context of the EU financial regulation. In the concluding 
section, we try to condense our findings into a tentative typology. We point to an important, 
yet not always explicit distinction between ‘literal’ transparency and ‘abstract’ transparency, 
and we observe combinations between ‘disciplinary’ and ‘enabling’ uses of transparency-
making devices. These articulations of transparency, we suggest, are central to the 
development of new instruments of government. 
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Introduction 
 
Wim Duisenberg, former president of the European Central Bank, asserted that the ECB, as 
compared to the Fed, follows a policy of total transparency; Pascal Lamy, while member of 
the EU Commission, said that transparency is a key component of the governance 
developments required by globalisation; the European Union has increased transparency to be 
closer to its citizens (Peterson 1995; Deckmyn and Thompson 1998). International treaties 
like the Aarhus Convention try to set norms of transparency for specific policy domains such 
as the environment. The director of the French financial markets’ regulator and the governor 
of the Banque de France say that financial transparency is one of the conditions for the 
efficacy of markets (COB and Commission Bancaire 1998, p. 5-10). In the cover of a recent 
book about financial markets, electronic trading is said to bring liquidity, accessibility and 
transparency to the markets (Young and Theys 1999). Management scholars experience an 
increasing inclination to explore this term (Larsson and Lundberg 1998), and so do avant-
garde essayists (Brin 1998). The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), a 
group of powerful institutional investors, calls for transparency in all aspects of the 
shareholders-management nexus; ICGN principles build on and amplify the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance (OECD 1999, revised in 2004). Law and administration are 
increasingly required to be transparent (Conseil d’Etat 1998). The Cromme Commission has 
recently amended the German Corporate Governance Code, whose aim is to make Germany’s 
corporate governance rules transparent and understandable.  
Do all or any of these instances of the notion of transparency share all or any of their 
dimensions? Does this vocabulary define a new way of representing accuracy and fairness in 
economic and political activities? Is it an answer to the increasing demand for ethics in the 
economy? Does transparency correspond to a new principle of socio-economic organisation? 
The analysis of the meaning and use of such a notion is far from straightforward. On the one 
hand, transparency is drowning in polysemy, misunderstandings, or empty statements. On the 
other hand, the notion is widely used by actors not only concerned with representing 
economic, social and political life, but also with intervening in it. The notion of transparency 
seems to be both relevant and ambiguous. The aim of this paper is not – and cannot be – to 
provide a definition of transparency that would embrace all its different uses. Rather, we 
would like to focus on a limited number of these in order to find out whether it is possible to 
identify common elements, an underlying logic that may help understand the rise of 
transparency. 
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This article is going to focus on transparency more as a ‘device’ or an ‘instrument’ 
than as a ‘principle’ (a dimension explored at length elsewhere in Garsten and Lindh de 
Montoya, forthcoming). We connect here with the Foucauldian analysis of technologies of 
government and, more precisely, with recent developments in the study of ‘governmentality’ 
(Miller and Rose 1990; Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). A 
particular feature of advanced liberal democracies is, within this perspective, the reduction of 
the costs of control and the proliferation of ‘self-correcting’ actors. This practical economy of 
power is based on the development of devices (dispositifs) that are able to distribute control 
and enact autonomy at local levels. Accounting (Power 1996) and audit (Power 1997) are 
good examples of this array of devices (see Thedvall, forthcoming, for a cogent review). The 
history of statistical instruments provides other interesting illustrations (Desrosières 1998). In 
the area of public policy, the increasing use of one particular device, independent regulatory 
agencies, has led to terms like ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1996, 1997) or ‘regulatory 
capitalism’ (Levi-Faur 2005), thus implying a particularly profound change enacted by such 
instruments.2 These devices can easily be thought of, in some sense, as ‘transparency-making’ 
devices to the extent that they prompt some kind of visibility, calculability and accountability.  
Is transparency thus becoming a general resource for governing contemporary 
economies? How does transparency activate (and deactivate) political instances? The trouble 
with claims for (or against) transparency is that they introduce intricate, pragmatic questions: 
who claims, against whom, how, by what means, and to what purpose? A claim for 
transparency first understood as a call for representative and public proofs can suddenly turn 
into a call for surveillance and authoritative supervision. Take the case of activists, say, 
opposed to nuclear energy, that condemn the opacity of a corporation or an institution, e.g. 
nuclear energy authorities, and therefore ask for more transparency (Chateauraynaud and 
Torny 1999). They are then inundated with massive, detailed, abstruse information on weekly 
incident reports, and are finally forced to demand some kind of filtering. The social meaning 
of transparency can be rendered explicit only through an inquiry into the mediations and 
delegations upon which it calls. 
The purpose of this paper is to make such processes more explicit by looking at the 
different dimensions of transparency in concrete arenas. We aim at developing a typology of 
the uses of transparency which may help to clarify debates on transparency and limit 
misunderstandings caused by its contradictory uses. We begin by exploring the deployment of 
transparency in a leading economic literature database, so as to ascertain whether we are right 
in identifying both its rise and intrinsic polysemy. We identify three thematic areas, namely, 
markets and price discovery, corporate management and institutional investors, and state 
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regulations and economic policy. We then tackle these three thematic areas in the three 
following sections, through three brief case studies: (1) transparency and anonymity in the 
context of exchange automation at the Paris Bourse, (2) a ballot statement controversy in the 
light of corporate governance principles at CalPERS and (3) the use of transparency at a state 
level in the context of the EU financial regulation. In a final section, we try to condense our 
findings into a tentative typology, and go back to our guiding hypotheses and see if they still 
hold. 
 
Pervasiveness and the polysemy of transparency: a preliminary appraisal 
 
We would like to explore two sets of intuitions in this section, with the help of rather basic 
quantitative techniques based on network analysis. The first one concerns the rise of 
transparency in economic and political discourses: are we really observing an increasing 
pervasiveness of transparency? The second relates to the polysemy of the notion: what people 
mean when they say ‘transparency’ may often be contradictory, unrelated, or thematically 
divergent. 
We have chosen to use the Econlit database as a ‘corpus’ of reference. Maintained by 
the American Economic Association, and holding more than 630,000 records, Econlit 
coverage includes major economic and political journals’ articles, books, collective volumes, 
dissertations, working papers in economics and book reviews appearing in the Journal of 
Economic Literature. This impressive range of sources, types of documents and the 
international scope of this bibliographical database are our rationale for using it as a litmus 
test for the global development of transparency. Of course, we acknowledge the distance that 
may separate scholarly vocabulary from an actual use of a notion in practice. Media coverage, 
operational reporting or ethnographic interviews may provide textual material more suitable 
to a study of a notion ‘at work’. But the academic literature serves our purpose well for at 
least two reasons: first, efforts in the articulation of a notion (definitions, discussions, 
associations) are particularly visible in this kind of literature; second, current literature in 
economic sciences encompasses a wide array of disciplines that are often close to 
interventions in operational realms (such as accounting or financial engineering) and that 
feed, in a rather reflexive fashion, the construction of economic institutions (Callon 1998). 
Let us get started with a simple indicator of relevance, which should allow us to 
answer how often transparency, or its adjectival or adverbial forms, e.g. ‘transparent’, appear 
in the economic literature, while controlling for the fluctuation in total number of records in 
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the database. We have displayed in Graphic 1 the result of dividing the hits of the search 
string /transparen*/ by the total number of records in the Econlit database, computed for each 
year from 1986 onwards.3 We notice a clearly increasing trend, with particularly sharp rises in 
1998 and 1999, in the wake of the Asian crisis. 
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Graphic 1: The rise and rise of transparency 
Hits of /transparen*/ divided by total records in EconLit, times 1000. 
 
What is transparency ‘made of’? What terms do we find it associated with? Based on 
previous encounters with the notion, we expected a set of clusters or ‘regions of usage’. We 
have therefore extracted optimized clusters of terms that tend to appear in the same abstracts 
in the Econlit ‘/transparen*/ corpus’, in order to check our impression of the variety of 
meanings associated with this notion (see Table 1). Although the technique is far from 
perfect, we can tentatively recognize a number of regions of usage that fit quite interestingly 
with our expectations.4
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Cluster Associated terms 
Central banks /bank/ /central/ /inflation/ /monetary/ /policies/ /rate/ /stabilisation/ /target/ 
Taming governments /accountability/ /government/ /institution/ /political/ /public/ /reform/ 
Budgets and taxes /budget/ /debt/ /fiscal/ /macroeconomic/ /tax/ 
Eurosclerosis /europe/ /growth/ /level/ /model/ /performance/ 
Risky funds /asset/ /fund/ /management/ /pension/ /risk/ 
Privatized corruption /business/ /competition/ /corrupt*/ /privatization/ 
Liquid exchanges /credibility/ /exchange/ /liquidity/ /stock/ 
Shareholders in control /companies/ /control/ /corporate/ /equity/ /sharehold*/ 
The Asian crisis /asia/ /crisis/ /disclosure/ /international/ /standards/ 
Prices/trade /cost/ /finance/ /firm/ /information/ /invest*/ /market/ /price/ /rule/regulat*/ /trade/ 
 
Table 1: Transparency clusters 
Optimized clusters in our Econlit /transparen*/ corpus. 
 
 
Sample quote (from abstracts): Source: Area of meaning: 
‘[O]rder flow transparency, which is 
supported by an electronic trading 
platform, improves price discovery.’ 
Chng (2004) 
 
‘[T]he decrease in market transparency 
does not compromise market liquidity.’ 
Tse and Hackard (2004) 
‘In all cases, less transparent sellers have 
an advantage in bidding relative to more 
transparent sellers.’ 
Wilson and Dahl (2004) 
Market microstructure, design of 
financial exchange, quality of price 
formation (or ‘price discovery’), 
visibility and calculability of prices, with 
references to their public display (at-a-
distance), emphasis on quantitative data 
and considerations of a game-theoretical 
kind. 
‘[D]espite increasing disclosure 
requirements, a firm’s net risk profile may 
not be transparent to shareholders.’ 
Hallerbach and Menkveld 
(2004) 
 
‘We investigate corporate transparency, 
defined as the availability of firm-specific 
information to those outside publicly 
traded firms.’ 
Bushman, Piotroski and 
Smith (2004) 
‘[W]ith institutional investors as 
stakeholders in the holding company, this 
structure is suited for more transparency 
and disclosure.’ 
Loulmet (2004) 
Corporate governance, information 
disclosure to shareholders (with an 
emphasis on misperceptions), risk 
assessment, with reference to reporting, 
to accounting, to information systems and 
to indicators (qualitative and 
quantitative). 
 
‘[P]rivate-sector economists do not 
consider the ECB transparent.’ 
De Haan, Amtenbrink and 
Waller (2004) 
 
‘Monetary Policy transparency improves 
the workings of financial markets, 
enhances central bank credibility and 
eliminates market uncertainties and 
volatilities.’ 
Nel and Lekalake (2004) 
‘In order for an international arms trade tax 
to work, the level of transparency in the 
international arms trade would need to 
increase.’ 
Brzoska (2004) 
Economic policy, with an emphasis on 
central banking and on public 
understanding of monetary policy, with a 
national or continental scope, and 
considerations on procedures of 
communication and control at a state 
level. 
 
 
Table 2: Transparency samples 
Excerpts containing /transparen*/ from 2004 abstracts included in the EconLit database. 
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Sometimes openly imprecise, sometimes carefully framed and defined, the notion of 
transparency refers to several kinds of objects: firms, prices, governments, etc. The way in 
which these objects are referred to is also variable: declarative disclosure, quantitative 
monitoring, etc. Connotations of the use of this notion are primarily positive, although 
sometimes warnings against excesses of transparency can be raised. In Table 2, we provide 
some isolate – out of context – excerpts from the 2004 sample that can give the flavour of the 
dominant vocabulary associated with transparency. 
We would now like to identify three ‘areas of meaning’ that correspond, roughly, to 
price discovery, corporate governance and economic policy. These areas are far from 
exhaustive and exclusive, but they seem to make sense, at least, at a macroscopic level. In 
Graphic 2, we confront this intuition with a correspondence analysis: i.e. a map that organizes 
the associations between terms that are most frequently present in abstracts containing the 
notion of transparency. 
As is visible in the scatterplot (Graphic 2) the two dimensions of the correspondence 
analysis have identified, quite sharply, an X axis that goes from monetary policies of central 
banks to firms and corporate governance, and an Y axis from trade and price formation in 
markets to a (less clear) focus on budgetary restraint and the perverse consequences of 
privatization (i.e. corruption). A central region is shared by all ‘use regions’, which stresses 
the potential ambiguities of the notion. Trust, confidence, regulation and disclosure, control, 
standards and performance are thus the shared vocabulary of transparency. 
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Graphic 2: A map of transparency 
Words appearing in the same abstract containing /transparen*/ (from 1996 to 2004) are 
associated and displayed here graphically through a correspondence analysis scatterplot. 
 
Representing through prices 
 
Let us focus on the area of financial markets, understood in the sense of the ‘exchange’, i.e. 
the trading environment where the formation of equity prices is organized. In this area, we 
find some of the keywords associated with what economists call ‘market microstructure’ or 
‘price discovery’: liquidity, efficiency, volatility, that is to say, the vocabulary developed to 
describe the behaviour of prices. The notion of transparency is quite present in this 
vocabulary. It is used in market microstructure literature (e.g. Madhavan 1996, 2000; 
Bloomfield and O’Hara 2000), a literature that is particularly present in the above-mentioned 
corpus. 
In this kind of semiotic environment, the word ‘transparency’ to a large extent refers 
to the ‘disclosure’ of market information. Market information can embody very precise and 
varied definitions: price of executed trades, quantities, bid or ask price for standing orders, 
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market depth (i.e. unexecuted limit orders that are waiting in the order book of a stock), but 
also the identity of the parties who place those orders (identity of stockbrokers and 
intermediaries, or identity of investors). Lee (1998, p. 97-99) identifies not less than eighteen 
parameters that can enter in the definition of transparency in this precise context. This kind of 
procedural, often quasi-algorithmic, discussion on transparency is often associated with the 
rise of electronic mediation in financial exchanges.5 According to this kind of literature, the 
type of transparency can have an effect on the behaviour of prices and the efficiency of 
allocation.6 It can also open (or close) opportunities for strategic behaviour. For instance, if 
traders can recognize the identity of potential counterparts, collusion is likely to be enhanced, 
whereas a blind auction protocol may reduce such kind of behaviour. 
An interesting shift of meaning can be observed precisely with regard to the 
identification of counterparts and the introduction of anonymity in financial exchanges. The 
notion of transparency has been often employed in a ‘literal’ sense: a market is transparent if 
market participants can see or recognise each other, as is the case for stockbrokers in an open 
outcry market. In this sense, a market in which the anonymity of counterparts is enforced is 
perceived as opaque. But this meaning of transparency is not stable. With the rise of 
electronic trading, anonymity can be conceived of as a quality criterion and thus be an 
element of transparency. It is not unusual, nowadays, to read that a marketplace guaranties 
both ‘the transparency of prices and price-setting rules’ and the ‘non-discrimination and 
anonymity of participants’.7
Let us explore this phenomenon with a close look at the case of the Paris Bourse, 
which became a fully automated stock exchange in the late 1980s: the open outcry institution 
(the exchange ‘floor’) was abolished and replaced by an electronic quotation system that 
conducted the ‘price discovery’ process automatically (see Bacot, Dubroeucq and Juvin 1989 
for a first-hand account). The notion of transparency was used by bankers to push for this 
innovation (Commission Pérouse 1981, vol. II, p. 185-195). It was about breaking the ‘closed’ 
culture of the agents de change, the French stockbrokers that were monopolizing trading at 
that time. But the agents de change had also an argument for transparency: they needed to 
recognize each other in order to guarantee a sound and liquid trading process.8 The engineers 
in charge of the reform decided to publicize the identity of the agents de change among 
themselves in their new trading terminals (through an identification code). The new trading 
architecture was said to be transparent because it allowed stockbrokers (but not investors) to 
observe each other in their trading screens. This gave stockbrokers the capacity to detect and 
contact each other individually (through the telephone) and arrange bilateral deals below the 
public order book. 
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This prerogative lasted until quite recently. But in April 2001, with the advent of the 
new Euronext market model, the Paris Bourse decided to enforce full anonymity in its trading 
system – a decision that caused discontent among Parisian stockbrokers.9 One may see in this 
decision an effect of the struggle between competing trading platforms in Europe. The Paris 
Bourse needed to attract big international intermediaries (and especially big Anglo-American 
brokers and investors) that are usually inclined to trade in more anonymous environments 
(such as quote-driven markets). But the decision was also justified in more transparency-
friendly terms. If the market allows for the recognition of individual counterparts, then the 
publicity of price formation cannot be guaranteed.10 Bilateral trades typically correspond to an 
‘over the counter’ procedure, whereas the principle that guarantees the production of liquidity 
in an order-driven, centralised market is precisely the fact that the order book of an equity is 
public (at least for market professionals). In this case, market transparency is strictly 
associated with the visibility of prices and volumes (bid-ask spread and market depth), and 
not with the identification of the ‘personal element’, to use a Simmelian notion. 
Perhaps this distinction between two meanings of transparency, one associated with 
the identity of market participation and another associated with a strictly price-mediated 
visibility, can be seen as an instance of a more encompassing distinction between ‘literal’ and 
‘abstract’ transparency.11 While literal transparency intends to preserve traits of the actor or 
object so that they can be easily recognised (we can see through the device), abstract 
transparency reorganises the task of representing so that they can be easily transported and 
processed (we can only see through the device). We can translate this to an economic domain. 
Literal transparency would refer to a kind of face-to-face environment such as an open outcry 
market, or to a mediated type of exchange where the identity of the parties is maintained (a 
telephonic conversation with a broker or a market-maker, or a screen-trading interface that 
allows the identification of the agents that are intervening in the market). On the contrary, 
abstract transparency could characterize an anonymous bidding protocol, or a clearinghouse-
type of exchange in which the counterpart is, by definition, not ‘chosen’ but determined by an 
algorithm and participants are translated through their abstract expression – prices and 
quantities. We may understand this move from literal to abstract transparencies as a shift in 
the architecture of different regimes of coordination. Literal transparency roughly corresponds 
to a world of networks à la Granovetter (1985) in where commercial transactions requires 
personal recognition and inter-personal entanglement, whereas abstract transparency better 
matches the neoclassical leitmotiv of an impersonal exchange mediated by a mechanical 
auctioneer (Ingrao and Israel 1990).12
 
 10
Monitoring corporations and avoiding monitors 
 
Transparent is a hard state to be in, since it diminishes your opportunities to behave freely, i.e. 
your actions will be scrutinized so as to check whether they are in accordance with the 
standards you are expected to follow. In this section we focus on an obscure controversy 
around ballot statements to further explore the elusive functions and actions of transparency 
as wielded in the ongoing battle between corporate managers, boards of directors, banks, 
governments and institutional investors over control of economic life; a battle in which 
investors have of late managed to score some points by increasing corporations’ transparency. 
We cannot provide a detailed background to this massive displacement of economic power13 
that appears in the right-hand section of our map, in which transparency has been playing a 
crucial role. To outline the rationale of this long-standing battle between managers and 
shareholders, we may turn to a crucial synchronising actor (Luque 2001): the OECD. This 
‘public’ think-tank of global capitalism framed the necessity of launching an initiative on 
corporate governance principles addressed at ‘governance problems that result from the 
separation of ownership and control’ (OECD 1999, p. 2, p. 12 in the 2004 version, which we 
use henceforth). Here the framework sets out to ‘ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership and governance of the company’ (p. 22). Transparency, thus defined, 
comes to be a central element in addition to ‘proper incentives for the board and management 
to pursue objectives that are in the interest of the company and shareholders’, by facilitating 
‘effective monitoring’ (p. 11). 
A telling example of how a powerful actor attempts to alter its relationships to other 
actors by means of transparency, is provided by the powerful retirement fund for California 
public employees, CalPERS.14 CalPERS has been the spearhead of the global ‘activist 
shareholder’ movement to redesign corporate law and financial market regulations to allow 
shareholders to more closely control the governance structures of corporations. It is a 
founding member of the International Corporate Governance Network15 (ICGN), and together 
they press for the worldwide adoption of the Global Corporate Governance Principles, which 
amplify the OECD Principles to which we refer above. We would like to focus on section IV, 
Disclosure and Transparency of the ICGN version (ICGN 1999), which demands ‘accurate, 
adequate and timely information […] so as to allow investors to make informed decisions 
about the acquisition, ownership obligations and rights, and sale of shares’. Among the 
information required we find that the IGCN ‘asserts that corporations should disclose upon 
appointment to the board and thereafter in each annual report or proxy statement sufficient 
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information on the identities, core competencies, professional backgrounds, other board 
memberships, factors affecting independence, and overall qualifications of board members 
and nominees [...]’ (our emphasis). 
This sounds familiar and sound enough. But CalPERS of course has a Board of its 
own, whose members are elected after publicising a ballot statement that is the sole source of 
information for CalPERS voters. We learn that the Board intended to amend section 554.4 on 
Candidate Statements in the regulations by which CalPERS abides.16 This amendment 
prevented candidates from stating the following: their ‘education and background, and a list 
of organizations to which the candidate belongs, and positions held in those organizations’ 
and ‘statements indicating the candidate’s opinion or positions on issues of general concern to 
the System’s membership may be included’. The amendment also denied the Election 
Coordinator the right to ‘request the candidate to verify the truthfulness of any factual 
statements’, for which ‘[t]he candidate shall provide timely verification upon such request’, 
under the risk of being ousted from the ballot if she did not comply. That is to say, incumbent 
CalPERS Board members rejected the very transparency guidelines they so forcefully press 
for elsewhere, since at least the positions held in other organisations by candidates are 
certainly ‘factors affecting independence’. The devil of transparency is mostly in the details: 
other candidates may challenge statements, but with a scarce five day deadline after mailing 
for filing these. These complaints must then follow an expensive procedure of private 
arbitration. Disincentives for information seeking and publicity are the equivalent to decoy 
and deception in satellite countermeasures, as they alter the cost structure of transparency-
based control. In fact, the displacement of controversies to ‘private’17 and expensive areas 
could precisely be part of the definition of non-transparency. 
What we witness in this jungle of rules and amendments is a fight for control waged 
around transparency devices: actors A(ctivists) were trying to discipline actors B(oard) by 
forcing them to provide a flow of information that would enable other actors V(oters), who 
could exert control on B, to form a judgment on their behaviour, as meeting (or not) a 
standard for public control. We would like to stress here that it is through a reference to a 
legally constructed ‘prudent person’ that the legal/moral character of their behaviour will be 
appraised. The California Constitution, in its Article XVI, section 17(b), states that ‘[t]he 
members of the retirement board of a public pension or retirement system shall discharge their 
duties with respect to the system with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with 
these matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims’. 
Transparency means here ensuring the flow of information that allows those concerned to 
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verify this character of conformity to public standards, and discipline the deviants 
accordingly. 
A second moral of the ballot statement story is related to the crucial issue of resources 
in transparency-making. As a US municipal bond market watchdog put it, ‘[i]t is not just 
getting the information, it is getting the information out there to investors who know what to 
do with it’.18 When challenging ballot statements, costs were very easily out of reach for 
individual claimants. Literal transparency of this kind may be replaced by abstract 
transparency, which means that another actor (the Attorney General was suggested at one 
point) will bear the brunt of verifying and controlling the production of the flow of 
information... but at a price. There will be increased opacity in the transparency-generating 
procedures – there are, after all, instances of Bruno Latour’s black boxes (Latour 1987). As 
the software programmers’ motto goes, good, cheap, fast, pick two. 
But how relevant is the ballot statement story in the overall ‘shareholders vs. 
managers’ epic? Here we should stress how relatively minor changes on what must appear 
where and when can profoundly affect corporate governance. In a recent rule issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (see Yenkey, forthcoming, for full treatment of this 
crucial ‘transparency-maker’), investment companies are required to disclose ‘how they vote 
proxies relating to portfolio securities they hold’.19 This should enable shareholders to 
monitor the proxy voting policies of the funds they have invested in, or in which they are 
about to invest. However, the matter of costs emerges again: how accessible20 is this 
information? As in the case of executive compensation, SEC rules may be next to avoided in 
practice if they are ‘literally’ followed, providing the required information in diverse and 
incompatible types of documents which require time- and money-consuming processing. 
Format, then, is of the essence in transparency matters. 
 
Keeping the state at a(n increasing) distance 
 
This section discusses several instances of the strengthening of transparency in financial 
regulatory policy. The rise of transparency in this area must largely be seen as the product of a 
changing view of politics in general, i.e. a means of introducing permanent scrutiny and a 
tendency towards ‘open government’ (Curtin 1998, p. 108).  
The simplest and one of the most developed devices of transparency in this area is 
access to documents. It usually takes the form of ensuring disclosure, publicity and 
accountability of policy processes and public finance. Access to documents reverses the very 
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logic of state secrecy. The state now has to disclose all information and quickly. Furthermore, 
if it does not disclose, it has to motivate and justify its refusal to do so. This strongly contrasts 
with ‘étatiste’ traditions like that of France, where the reference to raison d’Etat used to be 
enough to ensure the secrecy and opacity of large areas of public policy (but see Conseil 
d’Etat 1998). The European Union has pushed the debate on transparency further than most of 
its member states. Since 1993, the EU has ‘opened up’ its policy process as a response to 
criticisms concerning its opacity and complexity and as an attempt to bring citizens closer to 
EU-level  political processes. Since Maastricht, the right to access EU documents is written 
down in article 255 of the EC Treaty. As a consequence, the EU has quickly surpassed most 
member states concerning access-to-documents regulation21 (for an overview, Peterson 1995). 
In European financial regulatory policy, as in most other regulatory policy areas in the EU, 
the access-to-documents procedure is mainly used by financial firms themselves or lawyers 
and professional lobbyists working for them.22  
Most firms’ representatives or lobbyists, however, hardly ever have to go as far as to 
formally request a document. Commission officials usually send even preliminary documents 
rapidly to their contacts in the industry.23 Moreover, the widespread use of white and, 
especially, green papers or books which was taken from the British civil service ensure 
systematic consultation of market actors. The green paper implies a pro-active attitude of the 
administration. It seeks to inform the public on the administration’s projects and asks for 
reactions and comments that may be included in a later policy proposal (Lodge 1994, p. 
349).24 The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which is to remove remaining obstacles 
to the Single Market for Financial Services by 2005 (European Commission 1999), has started 
with a wide consultative procedure with ‘Forum groups’ discussing its main issues. Even 
though many participants were still unhappy about the actual input of these groups into the 
policy process, the Commission did circulate early drafts – i.e. even before green papers were 
issued – of most legislative proposals among the actors. In the case of the creation of a 
European securities’ committee, a Wise Men group published a first report in November 
2000, which was submitted to consultation to the industry25, well before the publication of the 
final report in February 2001 (Lamfalussy 2001, p. 13). 
This kind of procedural transparency appears in this context as a means of promoting 
the integration of financial and banking markets in the EU. Consultation of market 
participants means to increase the efficiency of regulatory policy, as well as the legitimacy of 
these measures. Their implementation depends, especially in the area of – non-binding – ‘soft 
law’, on the good will of the actors themselves. For instance, a recent voluntary code of 
business conduct laid down the rules of a European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS) on 
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home loans. Credit institutions across Europe are to respect the format of this sheet in order to 
render data on home loans more comparable and, thus, transparent (EMF 2001). 
Transparency has another meaning in the context of EU financial regulation: it implies 
controlling and limiting state participation in the economy.26 The so-called EU ‘transparency 
directive’ governs the financial relations between public authorities and public undertakings. 
Any public funds made available to public undertakings are to appear separately and be 
clearly stated in the latter’s accounts.27 The idea behind this is that state intervention will 
necessarily distort market competition. It is part of the more general policy of controlling and 
restricting state aids of any kind in the Single Market. The application of the ‘market investor 
principle’ is to ensure that the state as an entrepreneur demands competitive rates of return, if 
it is to avoid the accusation of state aid (Pesaresi and Rochefordière 2000). 
This line of thinking in the financial area has led to two notorious interventions on 
behalf of the Commission. In the case of the bankruptcy of the then state-owned French bank 
Crédit Lyonnais, the French state had to negotiate its rescue with the Directorate-General for 
Competition. Massive subsidies were eventually accepted on the condition that the bank be 
returned to the private sector by October 1999 (European Commission 1998).28 More 
recently, a complaint against the system of state guarantees for German public banks has been 
filed by the European Banking Federation. German public banks had been targeted by an 
earlier complaint in 1993 and the transparency directive explicitly aimed at their particular 
corporate structure. In December 1999, a new complaint argued that liability guarantees 
granted to public banks by its owners distorted competition by yielding normally high 
‘ratings’ which would not be justified on purely economic grounds (EBF 2000). As a 
consequence of the complaint, the guarantees will be removed by the end of 2005. 
Transparency here becomes a means of ensuring the limited and exceptional character of state 
intervention in the economy. 
The ‘transparency phenomenon’ has thus two main expressions in European financial 
regulatory policy. What we term procedural transparency is meant to ensure the openness and 
the legitimacy of the policy process. Actors are to be consulted and informed to avoid 
inefficient regulatory policies. Their input to the policy process shall also ensure the respect 
of regulation and the efficiency of markets. A second type of transparency protects the same 
market efficiency from state intervention. Intrinsically suspect, the state is put under closer 
scrutiny and its role in the economy is progressively restricted. The latter is clearly more 
abstract than the first, even if, as we will see in the concluding section, it is difficult to use the 
same terms to describe all dimensions of transparency.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
This section tries to pull together some threads from the preceding discussions. One of the 
major similarities in our examples is that transparency is about making things accurate, visible 
and comparable. Now, how is accuracy achieved? What is being compared to what, through 
what means of representing, and with what purpose? What forms of accountability and 
calculation derive from such arrangements? 
We can at least try to begin answering these questions. We may distinguish two main 
‘regions of practice’ where transparency gathers distinct meanings. We may call these 
‘disciplinary’ and ‘enabling’ deployments of transparency. What is characteristic of the first 
type (disciplinary) is the effect of holding a type of behaviour to account in relation to a 
public standard, through a description as detailed as possible of events and decisions. An 
interesting instance of this meaning of transparency would be MinistryWatch.org, a Christian 
charity watchdog29 that publishes a Transparency Grade ranking, and issues ‘Donor Alerts’ 
when a given biblical organisation fails to provide IRS data or audited financial statements. 
The core of the second type of transparency (enabling) is the setting up of an infrastructure for 
coordinated action (typically around exchange), where the amount of information about the 
intervening actors and objects is key to the initiation or stabilisation of joint operations. 
To this we can add the dimensions of ‘literal’ and ‘abstract’ transparencies, which 
focus on the means of translating actors and objects into manageable entities. Making 
representations more or less mobilisable, more or less public, letting actors see through 
devices or not, depends on the regime of coordination at work, on the political economy of the 
monitoring or exchange that is enacted. In fact, some deployments of transparency are 
intimately connected to anonymity, whereas others are meant to enhance the mutual 
identification of the actors involved. In both cases, the ‘public’ is constructed differently. 
Literal transparency stresses the individual engagement in the collective. It furthers 
intervention and participation. The public born out of literal transparency, so to say, is a 
gathering of mutually observed and entangled beings. But the existence of mutual 
arrangements make it difficult, or at least problematic, to gain an overarching, panoptical 
view. With abstract transparency, publicity is fostered but the public is ‘abstracted’. 
Representations can be aggregated more easily because the stress is put on procedures and 
mechanisms of visibility (read ‘of calculability’). Any participation that is not performed 
through these visibility devices may be seen, at best, as ‘noise’ (or, at worst, as a disturbing 
element that hinders the functioning of the mechanism). 
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So we would be left with something like Table 3, in which we have placed a number 
of illustrative examples. It is obvious that not all examples discussed above can be easily fit 
into a single case. Access to documents, for instance, is clearly literal, but can be both 
disciplinary and enabling. We can, however, satisfactorily locate a good part of the instances 
of transparency deployment in our rather minimal typology. Say that institutional investors 
would like to control the ‘ecological dimension’ of the companies in which they may invest, 
in the light of the Kyoto process or the likely consequences of global warming awareness in 
the economy. A convenient way to shift the costs of this control to those very corporations is 
to force them to report on their carbon emission level. The Carbon Disclosure Project30 builds 
such a regime, where companies become subject to performance, comparison (whether with 
competitors or themselves in time) in terms of their carbon emissions. From the point of view 
of individual investors, for example, their Climate Leadership Index becomes an ‘abstract-
disciplinary’ instance of transparency. 
 
 Means of representation 
Uses of transparency LITERAL ABSTRACT 
DISCIPLINARY Ballot statements regulations in corporations Market investor principle (EU competition policy) 
ENABLING Access to documents and green books in the 
context of the EC Treaty 
Paris Bourse’s trading system after anonymity 
(Euronext market model) 
 
Table 3: A tentative classification of uses of transparency and means of representation 
 
The refraction of transparency into this assortment of devices and discourses could 
perhaps better be understood within the remarkable framework of ‘justification regimes’ 
provided by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991).31 For these authors, a justification regime 
corresponds to a ‘common world’ which is governed by a particular ‘order of worth’32 and 
characterised by a ‘common superior principle’. This principle may be referred to when 
invoking justice in situations of conflict or dispute. According to this approach, several 
‘orders of worth’ can coexist. But agreements may be reached easily when arguments are 
compliant with a common metric, i.e. with a suitable justification principle. 
Is transparency a (or the) constituent element of a particular ‘common world’? 
Transparency could fit as a justification principle of the ‘market world’ since it is a notion 
through which the categories of mercantile principles can be developed: harmonious 
competition and revelation of desires and forces through prices. Interestingly enough, the idea 
of transparency happens to be central to the vocabulary of mainstream economics. But the 
‘industrial world’, the universe of organisation and machinery, could also be linked to specific 
uses of the notion of transparency that are close to the imagery of hierarchies and engineering. 
In computer engineering, in an interesting twist of meaning, a transparent network 
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architecture is one that allows the user not to notice that several hosts are performing tasks 
within it. However, in their study of contemporary forms of capitalistic legitimacy, Boltanski 
and Chiapello (1999) have identified the justification regime that characterises the 
‘connectionist world’, a world of management where activities are shaped around ‘projects’. 
These authors explicitly underline that the notion of transparency is not specific to this 
‘connectionist world’: while the market is supposed to be transparent in order to enhance a 
price formation process, networks (the main leitmotiv in the ‘connectionist world’) are 
recognizable only at local levels (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999, p. 194). An elucidation of the 
status of transparency as a justification principle in our contemporary economic world would 
call for an inquiry into the specific trials in where this notion is invoked and put to the test. 
Have we located the seeds, then, of a new ‘justification regime’? Probably not. 
Although transparency has come to be highly regarded in a number of spaces of public 
controversy, it does not seem to be the source of a ‘common metric’ for those spaces. But 
although not the source, it is certainly the precondition for increasing the ‘tension’ of the 
‘trials’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). Calls for transparency would seek, in our reading, a 
redistribution of resources to hold to (public) justification, to construct accountability, within 
diverse regimes, and thus with diverse and often incompatible meanings and implementations. 
In fact, one of the most remarkable properties of transparency – as our analysis points out (but 
see also Garsten and Lindh de Montoya, forthcoming) – is its ambivalence. Calls for 
transparency can hardly be stable and finite statements. Calls for transparency tend to 
engender (further) calls for explicitness. In order to be effective (i.e. politically relevant), 
transparency needs to be decoded and recoded, i.e. rendered explicit in a number of multiple 
ways. Should it translate into ‘full access’ or ‘filtering’, into ‘publicity’ or ‘recording’, the 
notion of transparency often needs to be folded into concrete (and differentiated) devices. 
In a political context of ‘advanced liberal government at a distance’, as the 
governmentality school would put it, the matter of the (political) representation of forces and 
interests seems to be intimately associated with the proliferation of transparency-making 
devices: access-to-documents protocols, price discovery mechanisms, reporting methods and 
indicators, etc. On one hand, this proliferation is ‘expensive’, in the sense that it requires 
strong ‘investments in forms’ (Thévenot 1984) and, sometimes, the demolition of deeply 
rooted institutions (the transition from open outcry markets to automated exchanges is a good 
example). On the other hand, it is ‘economic’, in the sense that it is usually driven by a ‘cost 
efficiency’ philosophy, by a concern about economising (the reduction of the state’s scale is 
usually presented in this way). Is this the reduction of the costs of control that for decades 
haunted the liberal utopia of a (transparent) market as the ideal interface between ‘self-
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correcting’ selves? Probably yes. Only it is important to keep in mind the variety of styles and 
modalities of transparency and to make the effort of decoding the many versions of these 
transparency-enabled entities. 
Finally, what socio-political changes does transparency both perform and codify in 
these recent years of its ascent? The co-production of governance by civil society, market and 
state actors is likely to be a candidate. Monitoring is both transferred to and embraced by 
NGOs in the largest sense33, as the Aarhus Convention shows. The distribution of power 
among actors, insofar as transparency is waged as a disciplining device and is defined by 
certain costs structures, must be taken on board too, as in the rise of institutional investors. 
The transformation of state action from being a central player to securing the framework for 
other players may be another leitmotiv of current changes. 
But in all these displacements the devil is in the details, which takes us to our initial 
stance of considering transparency as a set of devices, not as a principle. In the latter case, we 
may get carried away by the promises of enhanced mutual control, decentralized power, a 
longer set of dramatis personae in democratic life. Our focus on arrangements shows that 
how transparency is enacted (see Saward 2003) has a huge impact in defining what actors do 
get into the show, and their chances to have some say in how it is run. In suggesting our 
taxonomy of enabling and disciplinary deployments of transparency, we have tried to 
disentangle transparency when used as a technology of exchange from its use as a technology 
of government. As suggested by ‘Anglo-neo-Foucauldians’, transparency may well be an 
ongoing project to shift control costs to the very agents to be controlled, whereby they are 
expected to render themselves amenable to regulation by providing the means of surveillance. 
Thus, they increase their self-regulation, allowing ‘government at a distance’, but are in the 
process turned into subjects34 of ‘performance’, colonized by the very indicators they must 
provide about themselves (Dean 1996). 
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Notes 
1 A modified version of this paper is forthcoming in Transparency in a new global order: 
unveiling organizational visions, a volume edited by Christina Garsten and Monica Lindh de 
Montoya (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing). A preliminary version of this paper was 
presented at the workshop ‘Organizing visions: the ambiguity of transparency in science, 
technology and politics’, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Cornell University, 
Ithaca (April 19-21, 2002) and at the seminar ‘Illégitimité et légitimation du secret: approches 
pluridisciplinaires’, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris (December 10, 
2002). We thank Dominique Cardon, Eve Chiapello, Christina Garsten, Ellen Hertz, Stephen 
Hilgartner, Cyril Lemieux, Vincent Lépinay, Javier Lezaun, Monica Lindh de Montoya and 
Anna Maerker for their remarks and suggestions. Authors’ names appear in alphabetical 
order. 
2 See Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004) for recent developments. 
3 We counted about 1486 abstracts including /transparen*/ for the period 1986-2004; 1302 
for 1996-2004. 
4 The procedure to generate this outcome has been as follows: we accumulated all abstracts 
containing the string /transparen*/ appearing in Econlit from 1996 to 2004 in a single corpus 
file, with one abstract per line. We then located the appearances of a set of keywords in the 
corpus. Keywords were the most frequent terms in the corpus, with a threshold of 80 hits (for 
pure readability reasons), and lemmatized, i.e. grouped under a single heading (thus, ‘trade’, 
‘trades’ and ‘trading’ go under /trade/). This provided the input matrix for UCINET (Borgatti, 
Everett and Freeman 2002) that was transformed into a co-occurrence (keyword-per-
keyword) matrix by means of the ‘affiliations’ procedure. We then ran both an optimized 
clusters and a correspondence analysis, obtaining Table 1 for the former and Graphic 2 as the 
scatterplot of the second. The UCINET procedure we have used to extract these clusters 
(Table 1) from the keyword-per-keyword co-occurrence matrix is ‘optimized clusters’, based 
on density, and attempts to optimize these measures to try and find the best fit for a given 
number of blocks. We have chosen the best fit indicator to find the ideal number of clusters, 
increasing the number of iterations and random starts seeking more robust results. We 
reiterate that they must be taken with a grain of salt, since some of the terms ‘jumped’ from 
cluster to cluster in different configurations. However, most of them are robust enough to 
warrant their inclusion in our table, and they are born out by the correspondence analysis 
below. 
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5 See also Domowitz (1993) for an early survey of transparency protocols in electronic trading 
systems. 
6 See, for instance, quotes from Chng (2004) and Tse and Hackard (2004) in Table 1. 
7 These two phrases appear next to each other, for instance, in the mission statement of a 
recent pan-european electronic platform for greenhouse gas tradable quotas: ‘La Bourse 
française d’échange de quotas de CO2 devrait être opérationnelle en mars’, Le Monde, 
January 7, 2005. 
8 This and what follows is based on field interviews with several actors involved in this 
process. Interview were carried out between 1999 and 2002. 
9 ‘L’anonymat gêne les professionnels’, La Tribune, April 24, 2001. 
10 On this issue see also Lee (1998, p. 234-238) and Biais, Foucault and Hillion (1997, p. 53-
68). 
11 This use of the notion of ‘abstraction’ is roughly inspired by Georg Simmel’s work 
(Simmel 1990). We also owe the distinction between literal and abstract (or ‘phenomenal’) 
transparency to Rowe and Slutsky (1997). 
12 See also Muniesa (2000) for an analysis of the neoclassical resonances of the Paris Bourse's 
electronic double auction. 
13 That ‘activist shareholders’ may now have the clout, resources and legitimacy to exert 
pressure on boards and management must be primarily connected to the momentous rise of 
institutional investors, which cannot be discussed at length here. See OECD (1998) and the 
articles of a special issue of L’Année de la Régulation on pension funds and shareholder 
value, especially Montagne (2000), O’Sullivan (2000), Sauviat and Pernot (2000), and 
Lordon (2000).   
14 We owe some of our sources to the controversies among the actors involved such as James 
McRitchie (see McRitchie’s comments and correspondence at: http://www.perswatch.net/). 
See also: ‘CalPERS muzzles critics: ballot rules protect board, keep others in the dark’, 
Sacramento Bee, May 24, 1999. 
15 ICGN members were estimated to hold total assets exceeding $10 trillion in 2004. 
16 Amendments to this section were adopted by CalPERS Board on March 21, 2001, and 
became operative on January 16, 2002 (the California Code of Regulations is available at: 
http://ccr.oal.ca.gov/). 
17 Private, in a flow-of-information definition, means ‘under no surveillance’ by other actors, 
which in turn means that all costs will be born by the actors concerned, and no allies will be in 
sight to detect and punish deviations from publicly held standards. 
18 ‘Let there be light’, The Economist, February 5, 2005. 
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19 ‘Final Rule: Disclosure of proxy voting policies and proxy voting records by registered 
management investment companies’, SEC, release 33-8188, file S7-36-02, April 14, 2003, 
available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm. 
20 See Mercer Bullard’s comment on ‘Proposed rule: Disclosure of proxy voting policies and 
proxy voting records by registered management investment companies’, SEC, release 33-
8131, file S7-36-02, October 21, 2002, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/mbullard.htm. 
21 Major exceptions are the Scandinavian countries and, especially, Sweden, where such 
procedures have existed for more than two centuries. See Gronbech-Jensen (1998). 
22 EU statistics reveal that those interested in documents are academics (20.4%), public 
authorities (20.8%), lobbyists (17.6%), industry (15.4%) and lawyers (12.8%). The general 
public accounts for 8.1%. Numbers are for 1998 and all policy areas included (European 
Commission 2000). 
23 This is based on several interviews with banking associations and lobbyists in Brussels, 
Berlin and London conducted in 2000 and 2001.  
24 There are also more informal ‘consultation documents’ fulfilling similar functions.  
25 And, in principle, anybody else, as the report was available on the Commission’s website.  
26 Competition policy is the only area of EU policy where the Commission may investigate, 
judge and sanction. See Cini and McGowan (1999). 
27 Directive 2000/52/EC of 26 July 2000 (amending Directive 80/723/EEC); it entered into 
force on 1 January 2002. 
28 On the scandal of Crédit Lyonnais, see De Blic (2000). 
29 It is remarkable that the moral ‘constructed entity’ is described here in the relevant 
Christian sequence of confrontation, reconciliation and repentance. 
30 See: http://www.cdproject.net/. 
31 An English overview of the work of these authors is given in Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1999, 2000).  
32 This is the translation of the French expression ‘ordre de grandeur’, as suggested by the 
authors themselves (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999).  
33 Within the WTO the term NGOs includes economic interest groups in addition to 
traditional environmental or humanitarian NGOs. 
34 See Strathern (2000) for a bitter rejection of this process in the British academic domain. 
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